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abstract
This paper studies how marital anticipation affects female schooling in the presence of
gender wage inequality and private benefits of education. Gender wage inequality induces a
marital division of labor that creates (i) a marginal disincentive to girls’ schooling and (ii) a
tradeoff between consumption and education facing females in marriage markets. We show
that in the presence of the last effect, an increase in the market wage can have negative
consequences for the education of females who specialise in housework.
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1 Introduction.
Females in developing countries have traditionally received less education than males.1
There is also evidence of anti-female bias in child nutrition and healthcare (see, e.g.
Khanna et. al. [2003]). A common economic explanation is that these biases rep-
resent optimal parental responses to gender inequalities in returns to labour and
human capital (see Rosenzweig and Schultz [1984] for a seminal investigation of this
hypothesis). Faced with lower returns to females, parents shift resources towards
males.2
Gender biases in survival tend to get eliminated as household incomes rise above
poverty (Deaton [1989] and Rose [1999]). For biases in education, cross- and single-
country studies using aggregate data suggest that these too might gradually disappear
with increases in per-capita incomes. For example, in a comprehensive cross-country
study, Mammen and Paxson [2000] find that average years of female schooling rise
monotonically with per-capita income.
However, aggregate data can mask composition effects across different income strata
within a country. For example, in low and lower-middle income countries, where a
significant proportion of females receive either no or sub-primary levels of education,
gains at low levels of achievement would lead to an increase in average years, even
if there is stagnation at higher levels.3 Indeed, even Mammen and Paxson’s fitted
1See Dreze and Kingdon [2000], Grootaert [1998], Ilahi [1999], Ilahi and Sedlacek [2000], Ray
[2000]. As an exception, Munshi and Rosenzweig [2004] find that among lower-caste Marathas, girls
are more likely than boys to receive a modern English education, as opposed to a traditional Marathi
one. The arguments of this paper are broadly consistent with both types of findings.
2In this paper, we shall assume that there is gender wage inequality, while noting that the
empirical evidence for this claim is mixed. Kingdon [1998] and Nasir [2002] found evidence for lower
returns to girls’ schooling in India and Pakistan respectively, whereas Behrman and Deolalikar [1995]
and Aslam [2009] found the opposite to be true in, respectively, Indonesia and Pakistan.
3In South Asia, among the age group of 15 years and more, Afghan females have an average of
1.5 years of schooling with 80% receiving none; Indian females have an average of 4 years with 45%
receiving none; Pakistani females have 4.3 years with 51% receiving none, Nepal has 3.5 years with
50% receiving none. Apart from Sri Lanka, which is well known for its socioeconomic progressiveness,
Bangladesh is the only major country in which female achievement exceeds primary level (at 5.6
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regression lines suggest that the marginal impact of per-capita income declines at
low combinations of per-capita income and educational achievement – until roughly
1000 USD of income and 2 years of schooling – and only begins to show a steady
increase after this threshold has passed. Moreover, they also show that over roughly
this same interval, the educational gender gap widens.
In a paper that analysed the impact of economic growth on gender inequality across
different levels of education, Dollar and Gatti [1999] found that while economic growth
generally reduced gender inequality, in the ‘important’ area of secondary education,
females tended to lag behind males until a threshold level of per-capita income of
about 2000 USD had been passed.4
Gender gaps in enrolment are listed by level of education for a selection of low and
lower middle income countries belonging to Africa, South Asia and Southeast Asia
respectively. The first sub-column under level of schooling pertains to levels and the
second sub-column to the average annual rate of increase in gender parity since 1999.5
years) and “only” 35% of females receive no education (Barro and Lee [2011]).
4Dollar and Gatti [1999] also split their sample in half on the basis of PPP-adjusted per-capita
income. They found that there was no statistical relationship between female enrolment and per-
capita income, controlling for other factors, for the poorer sub-sample but a significant positive one
for the richer one.
5Average rates of change in gender parity were taken to smooth out the year-to-year noise,
provided that there were not too many gaps in the data series, as was the case for Afghanistan in
tertiary education.
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Female:Male Enrolment Ratio, 2011
Primary Secondary Tertiary
Average Average Average
Country Level Annual Level Annual Level Annual
Growtha Growtha Growtha
Burkina Faso 93 2.33 78 2.11 50 2.83
Guinea 87 2.27 64 4.4 36 8.4
Ghana 100 0.65 91 0.98 62 3.55
Afghanistan 71 5.97 55 8.605 23 N/A
Bangladesh N/A N/A 117 1.33 70 2.26
Indiab 100 2.25 92 2.48 73 1.53
Pakistan 82 1.88 73 -0.65 91 0.75
Cambodia 95 0.72 85c 5.07 61 6.04
Indonesia 102 0.49 100 0.47 87 -0.013
Lao PDR 74 3.75 94 0.83 86 1.72
Source: World Development Indicators: http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators; a: Percentage rate of
change in gender parity, averaged from available data over the period 1999-2011; b: all data from 2010; c: secondary school data from
2008;
One feature of the data is that, Pakistan and Lao PDR excluded, disparity increases
with level of education. Second, apart from countries that already had high gender
parity in primary enrolment by 1999-2000 (Cambodia = 87%, Ghana = 93% and
Indonesia = 97%) the other countries have shown increases at the average rate of
1.9%-3.8% per annum in this ratio. This suggests that primary education is more
or less moving towards equality albeit the Muslim South Asian countries of Pakistan
and Afghanistan are lagging.
In the case of secondary and tertiary enrolment, there appears to be a wider dispersion
in both levels and trends. Pakistan and Indonesia have the highest parity ratio in
tertiary education but the data for both show significant ups and downs in this ratio,
resulting in trends that are either low or negative.6 Also note that the countries
that had the lowest gender parity in higher education at the end of the millennium
(Cambodia = 32% in 2000, Burkina Faso = 30% in 1999, Guinea = 19% in 2003)
showed the highest growth rate but that is more a matter of having started with low
6In particular, Pakistan’s reported gender gap in tertiary education is quite anomalous in light of
its poor performance in other areas relating to gender parity in economic affairs, such as secondary
education and labour force participation, discussed later.
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denominators in the growth rate calculation
It is also worth noting that countries that are showing a reversal of the gender gap
in secondary education, Bangladesh and Indonesia, are countries in which concerted
efforts have been made to expand educational opportunities and social protection
programmes over the last couple of decades.7 Even in these countries, however, the
gap between male and female tertiary enrolments remains considerable. All in all,
the above data suggest that with respect to the above selection of low and lower
middle income countries gender disparity in enrolments continues to be significant at
all levels for a few countries, at secondary levels for a larger group and at tertiary
levels for almost all.
Since within a country higher levels of education tend to be the preserve of progres-
sively higher-income households, who also tend to have smaller family sizes, one would
expect gender gaps to be narrower at this level, even if the country itself is a lower
income country in which overall enrolments are low. That it does not, weakens the
hypothesis that gender gaps are due to rationing by income- and credit -constrained
households and implies that there might be other factors that impede the progress
of female education as incomes grow, both cross-sectionally within a country and
inter-temporally as its economy grows.
In this paper, we analyse the effect that the anticipation of marriage has on the gender
gap in schooling. We show that marriage exacerbates labour market inequality by
inducing a household division of labour that encourages females to spend time doing
housework. In our model, formal education has the conventional monotonic, linear
effect on market earnings, but a non-monotonic, inverse U-shaped effect on household
skills. This creates the potential for an anti-female bias in education. We show that
the bias is multiplicative in that marriage can lead to an even stronger anti-education
7However, Haq and Rahman [2008] report that while secondary school enrolments are higher for
girls than for boys in Bangladesh, retention and completion rates show an opposite pattern.
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effect than if the same female was expected to remain single. It is also discontinuous
in the gender wage gap, i.e. a progressive reduction in wage inequality does not
progressively eliminate the education gap.
We further compare female educational outcomes across two scenarios concerning
marriage formation. In the first, a solitary pair of male and female are exogenously
assigned to marry, with their optimising decisions on education and labour supply
following from this inevitability. In this case, each of them receives a share of ri-
valrous household resources that is also set exogenously. In the second scenario,
marriage formation requires the couple’s mutual consent. In this case, the division of
rivalrous resources becomes an important component of the decision to marry, and is
endogenously determined via pre-nuptial negotiation between the couple.
We refer to the first scenario as exogenous marriage formation and the second inter-
changeably as consensual marriage formation or in brief consensual marriage.8,9
In the context of consensual marriage, we show that each partner’s share of rivalrous
resources depends on their respective bargaining power and that this dependence can
create additional constraints on female education. The crucial assumption here is
that agents derive a degree of private utility from education, in addition to its human
capital-enhancing benefits and any contribution it makes to marital companionship.
Under exogenous marriage formation a female’s optimal education level is determined
8The term ‘exogenous marriage’ has been used by some authors to refer to what is more precisely
known as ‘exogamy’: marriage outside one’s own kinship group (see, e.g., Herlihy [1995]); to avoid
confusion we use ‘exogenous’ to condition the term ‘marriage formation’, which has been used by
other authors, e.g., de Moor and van Zandan [2010], to refer to the mechanism through which
couples are assigned to marriage. To our knowledge no semantic confusion arises between the terms
‘consensual marriage formation’ and ‘consensual marriage’ so these will be used interchangeably.
9The term ‘consensual’ has been used by de Moor and van Zandan [2010] in describing what
they formally call the ‘European Marriage Pattern’ (EMP). EMP is characterised by the following
conditions: (i) marriage formation is based on mutual consent, as opposed to parental or clan deter-
mination; (ii) on marrying a couple forms a new household distinct from their respective parental
ones; (iii) the internal household relationships are based on implicit and explicit contracts between
husband and wife and between parents and children and (iv) these contracts in turn depend on power
balances between household members which are in turn influenced by socioeconomic, ideological and
institutional factors. Our model of consensual marriage meets all the above conditions.
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without taking into account the effect it will have on her spouse’s utility. Under
consensual marriage creation, by contrast, both partners will take into account how
the other’s welfare is affected by their own choices. Take the case where marriage
leads the female to specialise in housework. From the male’s point of view, her
optimum education will be the one that maximises her housework skills but the
female herself would prefer a higher level, depending on the strength of her private
taste for education. In anticipation of pre-marital bargaining, the female’s parents
could restrict her education in order to make her more attractive to her partner and
strengthen her bargaining power over the rivalrous resources created by their union.
We also show that if the market wage goes up, with no change in the degree of
discrimination, her level of education might fall. This is because an increase in the
market wage can, under plausible circumstances, increase the value of the male’s
outside option more than it does the female’s. Of course, if the wage is high enough
so that a married female supplies positive labour, the need to contribute through
housekeeping skills becomes less important and her education can respond positively
to further increases in the market wage.
The restrictive impact of consensual marriage on female education need not apply
to all levels of schooling. Rather we assume that up to a point, exposure to for-
mal schooling complements hands-on experience in the acquisition of domestic skills.
There is an optimal combination of the two at which domestic skills are maximised.
It is only after this level has been passed that a conflict will arise between a female’s
education and her domestic skills. The potential for such a conflict is greater at high
levels of schooling than at low ones.
Lahiri and Self [2007] have also argued for the disincentive effect of marriage on
female education Their argument is based on patrilocal living arrangements that
lead parents to discount daughters’ education on the grounds that their income after
7
marriage will contribute to their in-laws’ household, while sons will contribute to
their natal households.10
By contrast, Behrman et. al. [1999] argue that the prospect of marriage can encour-
age female education. This is because women play a role in providing home schooling
to children. Thus more educated women are more desirable on the marriage market
as they are likely to be more effective home teachers. One implication of their model
is that with economic growth, the demand for sons’ education will go up, leading
to an increase in demand for educated brides and mothers, even if their own labour
market participation is low. Using data sets from India, they find evidence in support
of their hypotheses.
Behrman et. al. seem to negate our main argument, especially since our paper
shares important features with theirs: namely, gender wage inequality, specialisation
in household duties and marital selection based on female education. Yet the papers
are not mutually incompatible. For one thing, Behrman et. al. focus on agricultural
settings in which both the level of education needed to enhance farm productivity
and the mother’s own education level are implicitly at the primary level. Our paper
is more applicable to urban middle class settings in which men earn enough to allow
their wives to specialise in home production. In these settings, a primary level of
education is a foregone conclusion for both genders.
Moreover, if we interpret the household production function of our paper as incor-
porating the task of home schooling then Behrman et. al.′s argument implies that
as wages increase, the optimum level of education to maximise household skills also
increases. Indeed, if this effect is strong enough then it can lead to an increase in
female education at even post-primary levels. Having acknowledged that possibility,
10Lahiri and Self [2008] extend this line of argument to explain the anti-female bias in survival
ratios. They argue that in the presence of costly health care, both labor market discrimination and
an inter-household externality can lead to such a bias.
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our paper identifies a channel through which a private taste for education interact-
ing with pre-nuptial bargaining will, given a fixed technology for the production of
household skills, create a countervailing effect against female education. Which of the
two effects dominates is an empirical matter but the point is that these two channels
are not mutually exclusive.11
Chiappori et. al. [2009] also provide a rationale for the pro-education effect of
marriage. This result follows from the effects of marital sorting on schooling choice
when schooling not only enhances labour market returns but also the share of the
marital surplus accruing to the relevant spouse. While that paper’s analysis of the
sorting process is more detailed than ours, it’s model restrict education to a binary
0-1 choice with no variation across levels of education. The authors also treat the
marital surplus as a black box which increases in the combined education of the
two spouses, without decomposing it into a rivalrous and non-rivalrous goods as we
do. Thus the possibility that the marriage surplus might be non-monotonic in the
combined schooling of the two spouses is not present in their model while in ours, it is
precisely that possibility that creates a tension between a female’s education and her
marriageability and might lead her to lower her educational level in order to enhance
her household skills and increase her bargaining power on the marriage market.
In economic theory, formal education is assumed to enhance marketable human cap-
ital. If one applies this interpretation strictly, education should be measured not just
by years of schooling but by years weighted by a metric of marketable skills which dif-
fers according to subject specialisation. Marital matching might then operate through
the couple’s respective fields of study and not just their years in education. In that
case, less ‘formal’ schooling might mean less exposure to subjects that enhance mar-
11Indeed, even in our given technology for producing household skills, dropping the private desire
for education and adding explicit costs to schooling could result in a female receiving too little
education and then our model could yield predictions as to the effects of economic growth on female
education that are similar to those of Behrman et. al.
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ketable human capital and more time studying subjects that enhance domestic skills.
Folbre and Badgett [2003] and Fisman et. al. [2006] have, in separate experiments,
linked gender differences in fields of study and occupational choice with differences
in how males and females rate each other in terms of attractiveness. While the for-
mer authors found that both men and women who reported studying for or holding
non-stereotypical occupations were rated as less attractive by members of the other
gender, the latter found that females are more likely to select male partners on the
basis of higher intelligence and ambition while males are more likely to use physical
attractiveness as a criterion. Moreover men did not value women’s intelligence or
ambition when it appeared to exceed their own. Although the context of our paper
is different from the above two, its arguments shed some light on their findings.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 analyses the labor market and educational decisions of single individuals. Section
4 analyses the analogous decisions for individuals whose marriage is determined ex-
ogenously. Section 5 analyses the decision to marry in the context of a single male
and single female and Section 6 analyses specific examples and presents numerical
results for the preceding sections. Section 7 considers a marriage market in which
each agent has a choice over partners. Section 8 offers concluding remarks.
2 The model.
There are two households, labelled X and Y respectively. Each has one offspring,
intrinsically identical save for gender: X is male and Y is female. Each offspring
proceeds through two stages of life: childhood and adulthood. In each stage of life
they have a time endowment equal to unity.
In the childhood stage, the parent in each household decides the allocation of the
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child’s time between formal schooling and domestic training. This allocation deter-
mines the combination of labour market versus household skills that the child grows
up with.
2.1 Labour market skills and household skills.
Labelling time spent in schooling as s ∈ [0, 1], and the level of human capital as e,
we follow the literature in assuming a linear relationship, e = s.12
Household skills are denoted by α. Unlike market skills, the optimal development
of household skills requires positive inputs of both formal schooling and domestic
hands-on training. At one extreme, a child who spends all his or her time performing
domestic chores might not pick up the basic literacy and numeracy skills needed to
run a household. At the other extreme, a childhood spent entirely in formal schooling
would lead to no direct training in domestic chores.
The above properties are captured by a function: α = A(1− s) that satisfies:
(A-1): A(·) is continuously differentiable and strictly concave for all s ∈ [0, 1].
(A-2): A(1− s) ≥ 0 ∀s ∈ [0, 1]; A(0) ≡ α0; A(1) ≡ α1.
(A-3): ∃ a unique s∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that A(1− s∗) ≡ α∗ = max{A(1− s)} ∀ s ∈ [0, 1].
Together with (A-1), (A-3)guarantees that household skills are maximised only when
a strictly positive amount of domestic training is undertaken along with formal edu-
cation.
The level of formal education that maximises household skills might increase with
the state of development of the society and the social class to which the household
belongs. At higher levels of development and in higher social strata, not only literacy
12The literature usually assumes a proportionate relationship, e.g. e = σs, σ > 0. Our purpose
is served by normalising σ to unity.
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Figure 1: Household Skills and Market Skills
and numeracy but also exposure to the arts, history and literature might be important
for the development of domestic skills. What is important is that there is some point
at which further development of market skills comes into conflict with the formation
of household skills.13
Figure 1 illustrates the combinations of household skills and formal education that
result from any given choice of s. The horizontal axis measures time in schooling,
s, which lies between zero and unity. The vertical axis on the left measures formal
education, e, which lies between zero and unity, increasing linearly with s . The
vertical axis on the right measures housekeeping skill, α. Time spent in housework
as a child decreases as s rises. Accordingly, at s = 1, α = α0. At s = 0, α = α1 and
at s = s∗, α = α¯.
At any value of s, α and e are uniquely related. This relationship may be expressed
as :
α = A (1− e)
13Formally, the results of this paper merely require that household skills are a continuous function
of 1 − s and that they are not maximised at 1 − s = 0, i.e. there is some region of a child’s time
allocation over which formal education and domestic training come into conflict in the formation
of such skills. Dale [2009] takes a similar view of the relationship between formal education and
household skills, although unlike us, assumes that both formal education and hands-on training
contribute up to a point to the development of both market and household skills.
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where α = α0 when e = 1, α = α1 when e = 0 and α = α¯ when e = e
∗.
In the second period, the adult decides whether to marry or not, moves out accord-
ingly and makes a time-allocation decision between market work (`) and housework
(1 − `). This decision is made conditional on the individual’s marital status and
market wage. The latter in turn depends linearly on an underlying wage ωi and the
individual’s human capital ei through the linear function:
wi = ωiei (1)
where wi represents the hourly wage, and ωi is an underlying return to human capital.
Wage inequality implies that ω is not the same for both genders. A parametric manner
to express this is that there is an underlying market wage ω and that ωX = ω while
ωY = φω, φ ≤ 1.
2.2 Preferences and constraints.
We assume that childhood utility is separable from adult utility and does not depend
on the choice between schooling and household chores. Each adult has a utility
function:
Ui = u(ci) + hi + bei (2)
i = X, Y ; u(·) is a concave function of the adult’s consumption of a rivalrous market
good, satisfying u′(0) =∞; hi is the utility from consumption of a household good.
The last term in the utility function represents a non-pecuniary private benefit that
an adult derives from being educated. The possibility that education confers private
benefits on top of marketable ones is often ignored in the labour market and develop-
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ment literatures but is not without precedent in the broader literature on education.14
These benefits could be direct: education confers pride and satisfaction for its own
sake, or indirect: education enables individuals to seek out information which leads
to better choices.
An example is the link between education and health explored in the health literature.
As summarised in Cutler and Lleras-Muney [2006], a large body of evidence exists
for a positive relationship between health and education, even after accounting for
the effects of education on income. Their argument is that education leads to better
decision-making and information-seeking and thus helps individuals maintain good
health.
This assumption plays an important role in our analysis of female education through-
out the paper but especially in comparing outcomes across different types of marital
institution. We shall show that the presence of a private benefit from education leads
to an externality in the case of married agents: each agent values their partner’s
education less than the partner does. The relevance of this externality is related to
the labour market participation of each spouse. For example, if a married male spe-
cialises in market work while a married female specialises in housework, the male’s
private preference for education will be inconsequential to the female, but not the
other way around. This asymmetry will affect the marital decision-making process
for each prospective spouse.
For a single individual, market consumption is:
ci = wi`iei; i = X, Y ; (3)
where ` denotes the fraction of adult time spent in market work.
14See, for example, early attempts to empirically disentangle these two effects by Schaafsma [1976]
and Lazear [1977].
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If married, the consumption of the market good will be subject to a market budget
constraint:
cX + cY = wX`XeX + wY `Y eY . (4)
The utility from consumption of the household good depends on the amount of ef-
fort put into household production according to a concave function. For a single
individual, the utility is given by
hi = h (αi(1− `i)) (5)
where αi is the individual’s level of household skills and (1− `i) is adult time spent
in household production. We assume that h′ > 0, h′′ < 0 and that h′(0) =∞.15
For married households, we assume that there is (i) a single production function per
household; (ii) the ability-adjusted effort levels of each spouse are mutual perfect
substitutes and (iii) the household good is a pure public good.16
hX = hY = h (αX(1− `X) + αY (1− `Y )) (6)
2.3 Decision making.
We first impose the state of being married or remaining single and within each state
we solve for the agents’ time allocations, taking as given their levels of schooling;
then in solving for the latter we take into account its effect on adult time allocation.
We assume that regardless of whether their union is formed exogenously or consen-
sually, couples decide on their respective time allocation in a unitary fashion. This
15The concavity of h(·) can be interpreted in two ways: either that the household production
technology is itself concave or that the utility of household goods is concave, or both.
16In another paper, Jafarey [2008], the assumption that the household good is a pure public good
is relaxed and a more complete analysis is undertaken of the time and educational decisions of
married couples under both wage equality and wage discrimination.
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assumption is made partly to elaborate on Becker’s [1973] approach by exploring
the role of wage inequality in creating the mutual comparative advantage that each
partner brings to marriage, which then leads to a household division of labour on the
basis of efficient time-use by each partner. It is also made partly because assuming
non-cooperative decisions on time use could by itself lead to some of the asymmetries
in outcomes that characterise our results. Basu [2006] has already shown that with
non-unitary decision-making, the allocation of household resources depends crucially
on each members contribution to household income. In addition, Rainer [2008] has
shown that under conditions of wage discrimination, intra-household bargaining leads
to a magnification of gender inequalities in time allocation. In that sense, the results
of this paper show that such a magnification effect can arise even when the time
allocation of each spouse is jointly welfare-maximising. Furthermore, Behrman et.
al. [1999] show that when education increases spousal bargaining power, prospective
husbands become biased against female education for that reason. Our arguments
pursue a different channel for such effects so assuming unitary decision-making ties
our hands against the predicted outcome.
Moving back from the time allocation decision, we consider the marital decision, com-
paring outcomes under exogenous marriage formation with those under consensual
formation. We have already noted the importance of side payments in the latter case.
Since there are no bequests or outside assets in our model through which transfers
such as dowries could be financed, the share of each partner’s consumption in the
rivalrous market good becomes the main source of side payments. We assume that
a enforceable contract can be written over these shares through a pre-nuptial agree-
ment between the spouses. We also assume that the exact division is the one that
equalises the gains from marriage relative to an appropriate outside option for each
spouse. We initially assume that each prospective spouse’s only outside option is to
remain single, in other words, there is no choice over marriage partners. We later
16
extend this to a setup in which each partner faces a rival in the marriage market.
In the last step of our analysis, the education decision itself is analysed. In principle
this should take into account the impact of each child’s education on his or her future
time use in each state of adulthood, along with its effect on his or her post-nuptial
share in consumption in case of consensual marriage. In practice, this is done in all
states only for a female; for a male we impose a corner solution on both labour supply
and education in all but the state of remaining single.
In discussing the various cases, we shall refer to the “single self” of a married agent
as the same agent had he or she not got married and likewise, the “married self” of
a single agent as that agent had he or she got married.
3 Single agents.
On reaching adulthood, the agent’s human capital e has been fixed, as has α (agent
subscripts are suppressed since the problem is qualitatively identical for both). The
agent maximises utility with respect to labor market participation, `.
Plugging the adult budget constraints into the utility function, the maximisation
problem is expressed as:
max
`
= u(ωe`) + h(A(e)(1− `)) + be
which has first-order condition:
u′(·)ωe− A(e)h′(·) = 0 (7)
For the single agent, the first-order condition will hold as an equality since speciali-
17
sation is ruled out by Inada conditions.
The interpretation is analogous to the one in the standard case of endogenous labor
supply when leisure counts for its own sake. Here, the trade-off becomes one between
market and home labor. A small increase in market labor increases utility from the
market good by u′(·)ωe but reduces that from the home good by h′(·)α. At the
optimum, the two effects cancel out.
The resulting solution can be expressed as `(ω, e). As is well known, a non-monotonic
relationship between labor supply and the market wage is possible. A necessary and
sufficient condition to rule this out is:
(A-4): u′(c) + u′′(c) · c > 0
Under (A-4) it can be established that `ω > 0 (see Lemma 3, Appendix). Since
changes in e can also affect equation (7) through the home production function,
(A-4) is by itself not sufficient to rule out `e ≤ 0 but imposing a further sufficient
condition ensures that `e > 0:
(A-5): h′(α(1− `)) + h′′(α(1− `))α(1− `) > 0
(A-4) and (A-5) are in line with conventional restrictions imposed to prevent ‘back-
ward bending’ labor supply and allow us to set benchmarks for comparing time
allocation across genders and marital states.
The decision on education is taken by a parent during childhood.17 We assume the
parent takes into account the implications of education on adult outcomes. The
problem can be expressed as:
max
e
= u(ωe`(e)) + h(A(e)(1− `(e))) + be
17This is mainly for expositional purposes. We could equally have the child taking it themselves,
so long as we maintain the assumption that during childhood the child does not internalise the
welfare of the prospective spouse.
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The first-order condition is:
u′(·)ω`+ b+ h′(·)(1− `)A′(e) ≥ 0 (8)
The first-order condition can only be satisfied at e ≥ eˆ. But there is no incentive to
choose e < eˆ since eˆ is the amount of education where household skill α is maximised.
If the first-order condition is satisfied with equality, e ≤ 1. If, as a strict inequality,
e = 1. The intuition is that a small increase in education will increase the utility
from consumption, at given wages and market labor supply by an amount u′(·)ω`
and the private utility from education by b, while the utility from home production
will fall, at given levels of home work and production, due to a fall in home skills α
by an amount A′(e). These effects cancel out at the optimum.
Proposition 1 below establishes the effect of wage inequality between otherwise iden-
tical agents
Proposition 1: Suppose that (A-4) and (A-5) hold, then an increase in the wage, ω
will, for given underlying characteristics, lead to higher education e and more labour
supply `.
Proof: See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that a higher wage tilts the first-order condition
with respect to education towards acquiring more market skills and less household
skills. For given education, it also tilts the balance in favour of supplying more
market labour (due to (A-4)) and less household work. Under (A-5) the latter will
be reinforced by the increase in education. Thus on the whole, market labour will also
go up. Applied to gender wage inequality, Proposition 1 implies that a single male
will acquire more education and supply more labour than an intrinsically identical
single female. Because wage inequality is the only source of asymmetry between
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the single male and the single female, as the wage gap narrows so will the gap in
outcomes, until a benchmark of wage equality and symmetric outcomes is reached.
Form hereon, whenever the context does not by itself make clear whether we are
referring to the cases of single agents, exogenously formed marriages or consensually
formed ones, superscripts will be used to distinguish them: single selves’ outcomes
are labeled esi and `
s
i ; while married selves’ outcomes are labeled as either e
a
i and `
a
i ,
or emi and `
m
i , i = X, Y , depending on whether marriage formation is exogenous (
a)
or mutually consensual (m).
4 Exogenous marriage formation.
As explained before, we assume unitary decision-making in regards to the time use
of married adults. The household utility function can be expressed as:
V = {u(cX) + hX + beX}+ {u(cY ) + hY + beY }
Only the first four terms of the utility function are affected by the choice of labor
market participation. Given the exogenous nature of marriage in this section, we
further assume for the sake of saving on notation that the market good is shared
equally: cX = cY .
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The time allocation problem now reduces to:
max
{`X , `Y }
V = 2u
(
ωeX`X + φωeY `Y
2
)
+ 2h (A(eX)(1− `X) + A(eY )(1− `Y ))
18This allocation would result from unitary household decision-making, given symmetric utility
functions over the consumption of the market good and a utilitarian rule which assigned equal
weights to each partner’s utility.
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which has first-order conditions:
u′(·)ωiei − 2A(ei)h′(·) ≥ 0;
which is more usefully rearranged as:
ωiei
A(ei)
≥ 2h
′(·)
u′(·) ; (9)
i = X, Y .
In choosing education, we assume that the parents care only for the welfare of their
own offspring. We also assume that parents take into account the effect of their
own child’s education on own adult labor supply but not the spouse’s. Each parent
maximises the following function:
max
{ei}
u
(
ωiei`i(ei) + ωjej`j
2
)
+h (A(ei)(1− `i(ei)) + A(ej)(1− `j))+bei; i, j = (X, Y )
The first-order condition is (terms involving the effect of e on adult labor supply drop
out when evaluated at the optimum):
0.5u′(·)ωi`i + h′(·)(1− `i)A′(ei) + b ≥ 0; (10)
i = X, Y . It is clear from equation (9) that when φ < 1, both spouse’s first-order
conditions cannot simultaneously hold as equalities. This means that an interior
solution for labour supply cannot simultaneously hold for both spouses: either one
will specialise in market work, or the other in housework or both. Which spouse does
what can be determined by considering the implied inequalities in (9). Suppose that
when φ < 1, ωXeX/A(eX) ≥ ωY eY /A(eY ). In that case. three possible combinations
of spousal time use exist (assuming interior solutions for both market work and
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housework at the level of the household):
(i) ωXeX
A(eX)
> ωY eY
A(eY )
= 2h
′(·)
u′(·) ;
(ii) ωXeX
A(eX)
> 2h
′(·)
u′(·) >
ωY eY
A(eY )
;
(iii) ωXeX
A(eX)
= 2h
′(·)
u′(·) >
ωY eY
A(eY )
.
(11)
In case (i) `X = 1 while `Y ≥ 0; in case (ii) `X = 1 while `Y = 0; in case (iii) `X ≤ 1
while `Y = 0. Either the male specialises in market work, or the female in housework
or both.
Proposition 2 below in fact establishes that when φ < 1, then eX > eY in turn
implying that ωXeX/A(eX) ≥ ωY eY /A(eY ) (since education is always chosen along
the decreasing portion of the household skills curve, A(e)).
Proposition 2: In the presence of wage discrimination (φ < 1) the higher paid
spouse chooses an education level at least as high as that chosen by the lower paid
spouse (eX > eY ).
Proof: See Appendix.
While Proposition 2 covers all three cases concerning the division of tasks by a married
couple, we shall henceforth neglect case (iii) in favour of the cases of our main interest.
How do the labor market effort and educational levels of the married female compare
with that of her single self?19 Conditioning on a given level of female education, the
comparison of her market labour is stated in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: Given the same level of female education eY in both possible states
regarding marital status, a married female supplies less market labour than a single
19A comparison between the married male and his single self is made in (Jafarey [2008]) where
the output of household production is allowed to be partly rivalrous. In this context, it is shown
that so long as the male wage is sufficiently high or the public good nature of housework is not too
large, then the married male will in all three cases of marital specialisation do more market work
and receive more education than his single self at a comparable wage.
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one.
Proof : See Appendix.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 is that even if the married female were to have
the same level of education as her single self, it would be efficient from the marital
household’s point of view to make use of her spouse’s comparative advantage in
providing market income by allocating her to do more housework than she would as
a single female.
In comparing education choice between married and single females, a straightforward
comparison of equation (8) the first-order condition for a single female’s education,
and equation (10), the analogous condition for a married female, suggests that at
given values of eY and `Y , the LHS of the former equation exceeds that of the latter.
This is because for a married female, the marginal impact of education on market
income is discounted relative to that of her single self.20 Other terms in the two
equations are identical for both selves.21 Thus, at given levels of market participation,
a married female will receive less education than her single self. In fact, especially
in light of Proposition 3, we expect that a married female’s education will be further
discounted because of lower market participation than her single self.
This intuition is formalised in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: When married to a male who specialises in market work, a married
female will attain less education and supply less market labour than her single self.
20This is also true for a married male relative to his single self. The difference is that when
a married male specialises in market work, his first-order condition for education will hold as an
inequality regardless of the discount.
21Jafarey [2008] considers a setting in which the household good is partly rivalrous. In this case,
the last term in equation (10) will, all else equal, be smaller than its counterpart in equation (8),
indicating that some of the cost of greater education as reflected in lower household productivity
is borne by the spouse. This creates a pro-education externality which can lead a married female’s
education to exceed that of her single self, especially if the private benefit from education is high
enough.
23
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 notwithstanding, the next section will go on to argue that consensual
marriage might restrict a married woman’s education even more than exogenous
marriage formation.
Finally note that the labor supply of married adults reacts discontinuously to gender
wage discrimination. Equation (11) has established the existence of specialisation in
time use when φ < 1. On the other hand, if there was gender wage equality, i.e.
φ = 1, then the first-order conditions for both spouses would be symmetric and it
can be shown that `X = `Y and eX = eY .
22 This shows that due to the possibility of
specialisation, even a small amount of wage discrimination can discontinuously induce
corner solutions in the time use and education levels of one or both married agents.
This is not true for their single selves, since their labor market and education levels
vary continuously and identically with their respective wages . Thus as ωY −→ ωX ,
the time allocation and education of single agents converge towards each other.
5 Consensual marriage.
We now endogenise marriage formation while continuing to base our analysis on a
solitary pair of male and female. In Becker’s [1973] analysis, it is implicit that po-
tential partners differ in their respective labour and homemaking characteristics, so
that married couples gain by exploiting these differences on the basis of mutual com-
parative advantage. With gender wage inequality, asymmetry creeps in through dif-
ferences in time allocation and gets reinforced by education choices, even if potential
partners are intrinsically identical. As a result of both the wage and the educational
gap, the male partner may end up with a comparative advantage in market work and
22See Jafarey [2008].
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the female in housework.
With consensual marriage, a selection criterion needs to be satisfied for both partners:
Umi ≥ U si i = X, Y.
where Um stands for the utility from entering into consensual marriage and U s is the
utility from staying single.
We assume that the couple are able to realise any potential gain from marriage by
making a binding pre-nuptial agreement on post-marital outcomes. Since neither has
a direct preference over how to use their time, we assume that they agree to let their
respective duties be determined by a unitary decision-making process. But since they
do care about their own consumption of the market good, they can bargain over their
share of it. Let µ denote agent Y ′s share of the market good, so that (1−µ) is agent
X ′s share.23 In the context of this model, where there are no external assets, bequests
or other means to make side transfers, this is the only form in which such payments
can be made in order to realise the possible gains from marriage. In addition, we
assume that the pre-nuptial bargain results in consumption shares that split the gains
from marriage equally between the two partners. Because of the existence of only one
possible spouse, the outside option for each agent is the maximum utility they could
derive from remaining single. The next section extends this to a set-up in which the
outside option includes a choice of partners.
Given µ, the time allocation of the married couple follows analogously to the case
of exogenous marriage. The difference is that the endogenous consumption share
replaces the exogenously determined 50:50 split that was employed in the case of
23An alternative mechanism would be to allow an agreement on the weights ψ and 1 − ψ, that
would be assigned to their respective levels of utility in the unitary household optimisation problem.
For the functional forms assumed later in this paper, it can be shown that equivalence exists between
the two forms.
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exogenous marriage formation. The first order conditions for the optimal time allo-
cation lead to the following analogous cases.
(i)
ωXeX
αX
>
ωY eY
αY
=
2h′(·)
µu′Y (·) + (1− µ)u′X(·)
;
(ii)
ωXeX
αX
>
2h′(·)
µu′Y (·) + (1− µ)u′X(·)
>
ωY eY
αY
;
(iii)
ωXeX
αX
=
2h′(·)
µu′Y (·) + (1− µ)u′X(·)
>
ωY eY
αY
.
Three cases are again possible: in case (i) `X = 1 while `Y ≥ 0; in case (ii) `X = 1
while `Y = 0; in case (iii) `X ≤ 1 while `Y = 0. Since our focus is on those cases in
which a married male specialises in market work and his education is at its maximum
we shall ignore (iii).
In modeling the choice of female education, we now take into account not only its
impact on the time-use decision, but also its effect on her share of the consump-
tion good µ arising from pre-nuptial bargaining. This problem is formally stated as
(superscripts m denote consensually determined marriages):
max
{emY , µ}
UmY = u (µω(1 + φe
m
Y `
m
Y (e
m
Y , µ))) + h (A(e
m
Y )(1− `mY (emY , µ)))
+bemY (12)
s.t.
UmY − U sY ≤ {u ((1− µ)ω(1 + φemY `mY (emY , µ))) + h (A(emY )(1− `mY (emY , µ)))
+b} − U sX (13)
where U si = u(ωie
s
i `
s
i ) + h(A(e
s
i )(1 − `si ) + besi ; i = {X, Y }. The constraint simply
states that the female’s gain from marriage is no greater than the male’s. Relative
to the case of exogenously formed marriage, this additional constraint involving µ
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creates the possibility that consensual marriage can, under some circumstances, fur-
ther discourage female education. Noting that the utility from consumption of the
household good enters both sides of the marital selection constraint, the Lagrangean
associated with the above problem can be written as
L = UmY +λ
[
[u((1−µ)ω(1+φemY `mY (emY , µ)))+b−U sx]−[u(µω(1+φemY `mY (emY , µ)))−bemY −U sY ]
]
which has first-order conditions:
∂L
∂emY
= Γωφ`mY [1 + ξe] + h
′(·)
[
A′(·)− `mY
(
A′(·) + A(·)
emY
ξe
)]
+(1− λ)b ≥ 0; (14)
∂L
∂µ
= Γ
`mY
µ
φωξµ
+ [(1− λ)u′(cmY )− λu′(cmX)] [ω(1 + +φemY `mY )] ≥ 0; (15)
∂L
∂λ
= u(cmX)− u(cmY ) + b(1− emY )−Ψs ≥ 0. (16)
where
Γ = (1− λ)µu′(cmY ) + λ(1− µ)u′(cmX)
ξe =
emY
`mY
∂`mY
∂emY
ξµ =
µ
`mY
∂`mY
∂µ
Ψs = U sX − U sY
If a married female specialises in housework, and assuming interior solutions for eMY
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and µ, the first-order conditions reduce to:
∂L
∂emY
= h′(·) [A′(·)] + (1− λ)b = 0; (17)
∂L
∂µ
= [(1− λ)u′(cmY )− λu′(cmX)]ω = 0; (18)
∂L
∂λ
= u(cmX)− u(cmY ) + b(1− emY )−Ψs = 0. (19)
Intuitively, the first equation states that a small increase in a prospectively married
female’s education will lower her marginal household productivity (since A′(·) < 0 at
the optimum) and also lead to a relaxation of her marital selection constraint relative
to that of her prospective spouse (by the amount λb) but it will directly benefit her by
the amount b. At the optimum point, the marginal benefit equals the marginal cost.
The second equation describes the net benefit to a prospectively married female of a
small increase in her own share of the market good. It increases her utility directly by
u′(cmY ) but reduces it indirectly by relaxing her marital selection constraint relative
to that of her spouse by the amount λ(u′(cmY ) + u
′(cmX)). At the optimum the net
benefit must be zero. Note that an implication of the first-order condition for µ is
that:
λ =
u′(cmY )
u′(cmY ) + u′(c
m
X)
< 1
Turning to comparative statics, our main interest is in the effects of the underlying
market wage ω on outcomes under different states and institutions involving marriage.
Intuition suggests that while such an increase will increase the outside option for
both males and females, the former’s will increase more than the latter’s due to
wage discrimination. This will result, all else equal, in the male’s marital selection
constraint tightening relative to the female’s. At the same time, at given market
shares, both partners will also experience an increase in their respective marital utility
from consumption of the market good. All else equal again, this will relax both
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selection constraints. Overall, what happens to the respective selection constraints
will determine the impact of an increase in the market wage on the endogenous
variables.
In the Appendix we prove the following result
Proposition 5: Suppose that at an original equilibrium, the following conditions
are satisfied
(A-6):
∂Ψs
∂ω
− [(1− µ)∂u
′(cmX)
∂ω
− µ∂u
′(cmY )
∂ω
] ≥ 0.
(A-7):
(1− µ)u′′(cmX)
u′(cmY )
u′(cmX)
− µu′′(cmY ) = 0
then an increase in the market wage, ω, will lead to a decrease in both a prospectively
married female’s (i) education, emY and (ii) her share of the market good µ.
Proof See Appendix.
Assumption (A-6) covers two types of marginal effects of higher market wages on
male-female differences in welfare: the first effect is on the difference between their
respective outside options (both of which will increase); the second is on the difference
between their respective utilities from given shares of the market good (again, at given
shares both will also increase).24 Since A-6 comprises the difference between these
two effects, a plausible condition under which it would hold is for the first effect to be
positive and larger in magnitude than the second, unless the second effect is negative
to begin with.
Because of concave utility, it cannot be guaranteed that the first effect in (A-6)
will hold; however it will be more likely to hold if wages are initially low and/or
24Differentiating the RHS of equation (19) with respect to ω, the two terms affected are Ψs and
[u(cmX)− u(cmY )] leading to the expression in A-6 and the above interpretation.
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gender wage discrimination is high. Since the result of Proposition 5 are themselves
more likely to arise when wages are low enough (but not so low that the male does
not specialise in market work) and discrimination is high enough that the female
specialises in housework, it appears plausible that the first effect in A-6 will hold.
As for the second effect, it can go either way, depending on whether the female share
is initially greater or less than 0.5 and on the specific functional forms used. Indeed,
at a benchmark of µ = 0.5, the second effect would be exactly zero. This means
that if initial consumption shares are relatively equal, the second effect will be small
in magnitude whichever sign it takes. Since in our interpretation of the gains from
marriage, one of the sources of female gains is the increase in consumption of the
market good compared to what they would get if single, it seems plausible that any
male-female gap in marital utility from consumption will be muted in comparison to
the gap in outside options and that, since the second effect in A-6 depends on the
initial size of the first gap, it too will be muted.25
(A-7) restricts each agent’s Engel curve for the market good to be linear. The impli-
cation is that an increase in the underlying wage shall, at the original consumption
share, leave the ratio between the marginal utility of their respective consumption
levels unaffected. From a theoretical point of view, it rules out income effects on
marital shares which might influence outcomes either way. For our part, we would
not want our main results to depend on such effects.26
Under the joint impact of these conditions, the female both accepts a lower share
of the market good and presents herself on the marriage market with greater house-
25In the numerical examples that are studied in the next section, the equilibrium value of µ is
below 0.5 at all wages except the relatively low value, ω = 50, suggesting that the second effect in
(A-) is positive in most cases. Nonetheless A-6 appears to hold at all the relevant range of wages
in which the female specialises in housework.
26Without (A-7) a stronger version of (A-6) would suffice to establish the part of Proposition
5 that relates to education. However, since (A-7) appears sensible given our purposes and since
imposing it allows us to use the weaker condition (A-6) we have chosen this route.
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keeping skills. Indeed the latter prevents her share of the market good falling even
further. We now turn to specific functional forms and numerical simulations to obtain
further insights into the circumstances under which these effects occur.
6 Specific forms and numerical simulations:
We start by defining specific functional forms for key aspects of the model. Utility
from the market good is
u(ci) =
√
ci i = X, Y.
The relationship between household skills and education is
αi = A(ei) = η(ei − e2i ) i = X, Y.
where η > 0 is a constant parameter. Note that α0 = α1 = 0 for this formulation so
that strictly positive inputs of both formal education and home training are required
for a child to have any household skills at all.
Production of the household good is assumed to be equal to the efficiency-weighted
input of household labour. The utility from this good is given by
hi = β
√
αi(1− `i);
when agent i remains single, i = X, Y and
hX = hY = β
√
αX(1− `X) + αY (1− `Y ) i = X, Y.
when married. β > 0 indicates a relative preference for the household good.
The main purpose for using functional forms is to conduct numerical comparative
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static analysis and identify regions of parameter space which differentiate the two
main regimes of our interest in terms of marital time use in our model. In particular
we wish to characterise outcomes as functions of the underlying wage ω. However,
we shall first state some straightforward analytical results.
6.1 Analytical solutions:
The following reduced-form solutions can be derived for single agents:
`si =
ωie
s
i
ωiesi + β
2[η(esi − es2i )]
esi =
[
ωi + β
2η
2β2η
][
1 +
√
b2
b2 + β2η
]
i = X, Y
It is easy to verify that these solutions yield comparative static effects that are con-
sistent with the general analysis of the single agent-case.
It is also possible to derive explicit solutions in some cases for females married by
exogenous arrangement when males specialise in market work. The solution for `aY is
`aY =
φ2ωXe
a2
Y − 2β2αY
φ2ωXea
2
Y + 2β
2αY φeaY
;
When `aY = 0, a solution for e
a
Y can also be found.
eaY = 0.5
[
1 +
√
b2
b2 + β2η
]
which reduces to eaY = 0.5 if b = 0. e
a = 0.5 is the level of formal education at which
α is maximised in this example. Thus for b > 0 a female’s education will exceed the
level which optimises her household skills, creating a potential clash between her own
educational preference and one that might be optimum from her spouse’s perspective.
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6.2 Numerical results:
We conducted numerical simulations in order to compare outcomes across the cases
of single agents, agents in exogenously formed marriage and agents in consensual
marriage. Keeping other parameters fixed, endogenous variables were mapped against
values of the underlying market wage starting at ω = 50.
The benchmark values for other parameters are as follows.
Parameter b η β φ
Value 2 20 4 0.5
Except φ these values were not chosen on empirical grounds. In a detailed survey
of the Indian labour force Bhalla and Kaur [2011] estimate the unadjusted ratio of
female to male wages as approximately 0.58, and the value of φ is an approximation
of that.
Figure 2 depicts the results for the benchmark case. The numerical values on which
Figure 2 is based are listed in the Appendix, Table 8. This should be consulted in
conjunction with Figure 2.
The top left panel of Figure 2 depicts male and female labour supply and education
levels for single agents. The other three panels depict only outcomes for married
females, since males are by construction restricted to market work in these examples.
The top right panel shows the female’s education and labour supply when marriage
formation is exogenous. The bottom left panel depicts the corresponding outcomes
along with her share of the market good when marriage is consensual. The bottom
right panel magnifies the details of the female education choice in the latter case. In
each panel, the horizontal axis measures the market wage.
We also studied a variant of the benchmark model with almost no labour market
inequality: φ = 0.95 and other parameters as before. The results are presented in
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Figure 2: Single, exogenous and consensual marriage.
Appendix, Table 9. The results were qualitatively similar to the benchmark case and
the quantitative differences were in line with expectation: a reduction in the degree
of wage inequality will, all else equal, promote female education and labour market
participation in all marital states and induce a married female’s entry into the labour
force at a lower wage.
Some noteworthy features of the results:
1) The education and labour supply of the female’s single self is greater than that
of both her married selves at each wage. At low wages, mutual specialisation occurs
under each marital arrangement. when this happens, the education level of a con-
sensually married female tends to lie below that of her exogenously married self, as
anticipated in the previous section.
2) So long as a married female supplies no labour, her education steadily decreases
with the market wage when marriage is consensual. The relationship turns upward
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once her labour supply becomes positive. This is the key effect of this section and
is consistent with Proposition 5. In the case of exogenous marriage formation her
educational level remains constant throughout the specialisation regime. This is
because in an exogenously formed marriage, her education depends on the wage only
if she supplies market labour,while in consensual marriage her education affects her
relative bargaining power even when she specialises in housework
3) As the underlying wage increases, a housewife’s share of the market good follows
the same declining pattern as her education. This is also in line with Proposition 5.
4) The threshold wage at which a consensually married female enters the labour
market is approximately ω = 2300 in the benchmark version. In the case of a female
in an exogenously formed marriage, this threshold arises at a slightly lower level of
the underlying wage: ω = 2100.
5) Once the threshold level of ω is crossed, the female’s education level appears to
jump up discontinuously and from there to increase with further increases in the
wage. These results should be treated as illustrative, emerging as they do from
numerical simulations and specific functional forms. The intuition behind the latter
effect is that once a female begins to provide positive amounts of labour, she is
able to meet the male’s selection constraint, as represented on the right-hand side of
equation (13), partly by earning market income. Thus, in her educational decision,
the balance shifts towards acquiring greater market skills. Note also that the female
share in consumption begins to increase once this threshold has been crossed (see
Table 8). The apparent discontinuity is likely to be driven by functional forms along
with the discrete nature of the manner in which wages are increased throughout the
simulation.27
27Comparing equation (14), the first-order condition for female education for a married female who
supplies market labour and equation (17), the analogous first-order condition for one who does not,
there are terms in the latter which drop out in the former. In particular, note the unambiguously
positive term Γφω[1 + ξe]`
M
Y which gets activated when female labour supply is positive. This term
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6) Although not depicted in the diagrams, the utility levels of the two spouses move
opposite to each other when comparisons are made between exogenous marriage
formation (with equal shares) and consensual marriage. For the benchmark case,
Appendix Table 8 shows that female utility is greater under exogenous marriage
formation than under consensual marriage. However when the degree of wage dis-
crimination is low, (φ = 0.95) her utility from consensual marriage may be higher or
lower than from exogenously formed marriage: the former is higher at low wages but
the latter becomes higher at high wages. For the male the comparisons go the other
way. These results suggest that despite the discontinuity in the effect of even a small
degree of wage inequality on the marital division of labour, a reduction in inequality
can enhance the female’s bargaining power within the household by increasing her
outside option to a level close to that of her prospective partner.
The key result of this section is that consensual marriage can lead to a negative pres-
sure on female education, and this pressure might increase with increasing market
wages when the female specialises in housework. The reason is that when marriage
is subject to mutual selection constraints, an increase in the market wage can dispro-
portionately increase the male’s outside option relative to the female’s. Faced with
this, the female hedges between accepting a lower consumption share and choosing
less education, thus moving closer to the absolute maximum in terms of housekeeping
skills. This effect is reversed once she starts to contribute to the household’s market
income. At the same time, a reduction in wage discrimination (or an increase in
female wages alone) increases a consensually married female’s bargaining power even
when she does no market work and this increases her education and share of the
captures the benefit of female education for both her and her spouse’s utility from consuming the
market good (represented by Γ), both directly, at given labour market supply and by the positive
inducement that education has on labour supply (represented by ξe). This effect seems to drive
the sharp increase in education near the threshold. Of course, in principle this does not imply
discontinuity at values of ω arbitrarily close to the threshold but in the simulations we did not
control ω that finely, especially given that out main interest lies with the overall comparative static
effects.
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consumption good at given male wages.
7 A competitive marriage market:
We have thus far assumed that there is only one agent of each gender. This pre-
cludes the possibility of agents having a choice over partners. As Chiappori et. al.
[2009] have shown, marital choice matters for both the intra-household allocation of
rivalrous resources and each agents’ ex ante investment in schooling. Choice expands
each agent’s set of outside options and opens each pre-nuptial negotiation to compe-
tition from potential rivals. Since we are analysing the interaction between marital
selection and female education it is instructive to see the effect of competition on this
interaction.
We extend the model by introducing an additional male and an additional female, one
or both of whom differ from the original pair in at least one attribute. All attributes
are, as before, common knowledge. Index agents belonging to the same gender as
1 and 2 and suppose that the matching process is complete, i.e. both types of one
gender may match with both types of the other. As in the previous section, we restrict
our analysis to cases in which there is mutual specialisation in time use by married
couples. Hence, the total amount of the market good available to a married couple
depends only on the exogenous male wage and its total output of the household good
depends only on the wife’s homemaking skills.
Let (Xi, Yj) denote a couple formed by male Xi and female Yj, i, j = {1, 2}. Let eijYj
be Y ′j s optimal educational choice when married to Xi and µ
ij be Y ′j s equilibrium
share of the consumption good in that match. The pair (eijYj , µ
ij) is defined as the
household profile of (Xi, Yj) and it completely determines the utility levels of both
partners in (Xi, Yj). Thus U
ij
Xi
= UXi(e
ij
Yj
, µij) and U ijYj = UYj(e
ij
Yj
, µij). Finally, let
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{(Xi, Yj), (Xh, Yk)} denote a matching pattern which assigns each individual to one
and only one couple, Xi, Xh ∈ {X1, X2}, i 6= h; Yj, Yk ∈ {Y1, Y2}, j 6= k.
A stable matching pattern is an assignment {(Xi, Yj), (Xh, Yk)} that, given its asso-
ciated profiles {(eijYj , µij), (ehkYk , µhk)} satisfies
(A) : U ijXi ≥ U sXi ; U ijYj ≥ U sYj
UhkXh ≥ U sXh , UhkYk ≥ U sYk
and
(B) : 6 ∃ any feasible profiles (e˜ikYk , µ˜ik), (e˜hjYj , µ˜hk)
associated with alternative couples (Xi, Yk) or (Xh, Yj)} that satisfy
(i) U ikXi(e˜
ik
Yk
, µ˜ik) ≥ U ijXi and U ikYk(e˜ikYk , µ˜ik) ≥ UhkYk ; or
ii UhjXh(e˜
hj
Yj
, µ˜hj) ≥ UhkXh and UhjYj (e˜hjYj , µ˜hj) ≥ U ijYj
with “>” for at least one of the inequalities.
(A) ensures that each agent willingly enters into marriage. (B) ensures that there are
no feasible deviations from the candidate assignment and its associated profiles that
result in at least one partner in the deviating couple being made better off, with the
other no worse off, than under the candidate assignment.28 If (B) fails, then at least
one couple would mutually benefit by breaking away from their assigned partners.
Unlike matching models of non-transferable utility, such as Adachi [2003], in our
model each agent’s ranking of potential partners is endogenous, depending on both the
absolute size and the division of the surplus that their union is capable of generating.
In particular, the division of the rivalrous good depends on each partner’s outside
28This definition is adapted from Definition 5.2 in Adachi [2003] who shows that equilibrium
matching patterns in search theoretic models of marriage markets converge, as search frictions go
to zero, to stable matching patterns in frictionless marriage markets of the type studied in Gale and
Shapley [1962]. In Adachi’s case, preference orderings are exogenous. In our case, they depend on
household profiles. Accordingly in our definition, the profiles generated by each household under
the candidate assignment must be optimal subject to each couple’s mutual constraints; however the
profile of a blocking couple, denoted by ˜ need not be optimal, only to satisfy constraints.
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options, but these in turn depend on the surpluses and shares possible with rival
candidates. Thus preferences and outcomes are mutually dependent in our model.
We therefore follow a step-wise procedure in solving the matching problem. First,
we construct a matrix of household profiles and payoffs by arbitrarily matching each
male with each female. At this stage, we ignore the possibility of competition from
rival candidates. This effectively makes the outside option of each partner exogenous
and equal to their utility from remaining single at this stage.29
The resulting utility levels are then used to generate a preliminary ranking of each
agent’s preferences over three outcomes: marriage to partner 1, marriage to partner
2 and staying single. At this point, a number of different possible combinations of
rankings can arise. Rather than an exhaustive analysis of these combinations, we
focus on two combinations that are both relevant to the aims of this paper and lend
themselves to examples based on simple modifications of the specification introduced
in the previous section.
7.1 Preferred couple:
The first combination is one in which the preliminary ranking results in one male and
one female being unanimously preferred over their respective rival. Without loss of
generality, suppose that these are X1 and Y1 respectively. The rankings for this case
are:
U1jYj ≥ U2jYj ≥ U sYj (20)
29Although this scenario is introduced only as a first step in identifying a stable matching pattern,
to avoid semantic confusion we shall henceforth refer to it as ‘non-competitive matching’, while the
equilibrium matching pattern will be referred to as ‘competitive matching’ because it determines
outside options endogenously via competitive offers between rival candidates. Note that both sce-
narios involve consensual marriage formation and the non-competitive scenario is the same as the
one that was analysed in the case of a solitary couple.
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for both j = {1, 2} and
U i1Xi ≥ U i2Xi ≥ U sXi (21)
for both i = {1, 2}. In this case, both females (weakly) prefer X1 and both males
(weakly) prefer Y1. We call X1 and Y1 the “preferred” couple.
We now come to the second stage of our solution procedure and introduce competition
from potential rivals. For example, X2 might offer Y1 and/or Y2 might offer X1 a share
of the consumption good that differs from the one they would have negotiated if they
had been matched without external competition. Y2 might additionally deviate from
the education level that she would bring to a match with X1 under non-competitive
marriage.
In other words, if there exists an alternative profile (e21Y1 , µ˜
21) that satisfies:
UY1(e
21
Y1
, µ˜21) = U11Y1 (22)
UX2(e
21
Y1
, µ˜21) ≥ U22X2 ; (23)
(X1, Y1) will be blocked by (X2, Y1). In addition if there is an alternative profile
(e˜12Y1 , µ˜
12) that satisfies
UX1(e˜
12
Y1
, µ˜12) = U11X1 (24)
UY2(e˜
12
Y1
, µ˜12) ≥ U21Y2 ; (25)
(X1, Y1) will be blocked by (X1, Y2). For {(X1, Y1), (X2, Y2)} to be stable, no alterna-
tive profiles should exist that satisfy either equations (22) and (23) or equations (24)
and (25).
In the third stage, we describe a sufficient condition to rule out such profiles. Suppose
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that there exists a profile (eˆ11Y1 , µˆ
11) such that
UX1(eˆ
11
Y1
, µˆ11) ≥ U¯12X1
where
U¯11X1 ≡
max
{e˜12Y1 , µ˜12}
U12X1
s.t.
UY2(e˜
12
Y2
, µ˜12) = U22Y2
and
UY1(eˆ
11
Y1
, µˆ11) ≥ U¯21Y1
where
U¯21Y1 ≡
max
{e˜21Y1 , µ˜21}
U21Y1
s.t.
UX2(e˜
21
Y1
, µ˜21) = U21X2 .
then (X1, Y1) cannot be blocked by either X2 or Y2. Since both (X2, Y2) prefer each
other to remaining single the assignment {(X1, Y1), (X2, Y2)} is stable.
The above condition requires that (X1, Y1) are both no worse off under (eˆ
11
Y1
, µˆ11) than
either would be under the most favourable feasible profile that could be negotiated
with an alternative partner. This is a rather strong restriction and no such profile
may exist, leaving their union vulnerable to competing offers. If a profile does exist,
it might not be unique, especially when there is slack in one or both inequalities of
the above restriction.
This leads to the fourth and final stage of the solution, which is to pin down the profile
(eˆ11Y1 , µˆ
11) by defining each partner’s outside option as U¯12X1 and U¯
21
Y1
respectively, rather
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than U sX1 and U
s
Y1
.30 This ensures that, so long as the potential gains to X1 and Y1
from marrying each other are large enough, the resulting profile meets equations
(22)-(25)
Since X2 and Y2 have no prospect of a rival bid from their alternative partners, their
only outside options are U sX2 and U
s
Y2
respectively. In other words their equilibrium
profile will be the same as the one that is calculated in the first stage.
For completeness sake, we propose a simple adaptation of the Gale-Shapley matching
algorithm (see Gale and Shapley [1962]) for implementing a stable match. Start by
allowing both X1 and X2 to propose engagement to their most preferred female,
namely Y1. Since Y1 prefers X1 on the basis of his subjective attributes, she accepts
his proposal and rejects X2. The latter then proposes to Y2 who accepts. At this
stage both couples enter into pre-nuptial negotiation during which time any of the
four could break off the engagement. In particular, X1 and Y1 negotiate keeping in
mind that the other has an outside option worth U¯21Y1 and U¯
12
X1
respectively. This
generates the profile (eˆ11Y1 , µˆ
11). X2 and Y2, on the other hand, negotiate under the
outside option of remaining single and their profile remains (e22Y2 , µ
22).
We now consider an example in which the two males and two females are differentiated
only by their respective taste for the household good, β. Let βX1 = βY1 = 4 and βX2 =
βY2 = 3. The second type of each gender has a relatively lower preference for the
household good. The following table lists the profiles generated by non-competitive
matching.31 The first entry in each cell is female education under the given match and
the second is female share in consumption. X1’s absolutely higher utility from home
production makes him a less demanding partner than X2 in terms of consumption
share but more demanding in terms of housekeeping skill; in matching with him each
30Needless to say, the pre-nuptial bargain itself only determines µˆ11 but by backward induction,
this will be taken into account by Y1 in determining eˆ
11
Y 1.
31All parameters except for β are at their benchmark value and the market wage ω = 50.
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Table 1: Profile under non-competitive matching.
Y1 Y2
X1 (0.52836,0.51620) (0.53358,0.54641)
X2 (0.53063,0.45445) (0.53660,0.484595)
female receives a higher consumption share but enjoys less education than if she
marries X2. Analogously, Y1’s absolutely higher utility from home production makes
her choose higher housekeeping skill (less education) and accept a lower share of the
consumption good than Y2. Males prefer Y1 while females prefer X1, indicating that
in this case, the effect of a higher consumption share is stronger than the effect from
lower education.
The following table lists the payoffs associated with the above profiles. The first entry
in each cell is the male’s payoff and the second is the female’s. As expected, both
Table 2: Utility levels from non-competitive matching.
Y1 Y2
X1 15.8482, 15.0670 15.6864, 12.9871
X2 13.9184, 14.7555 13.7667, 12.6858
males enjoy higher utility when matched with Y1 (column 1 dominates column 2 for
male payoffs). Both females also enjoy higher utility when matched with X1 (row
1 dominates row 2 for female payoffs) indicating that the consumption share effect
from marriage to X1 dominates the anti-education effect.
Both partners in (X1, Y1) ex ante prefer each other to their alternative partners.
However, their match must be robust to counteroffers from their less preferred part-
ners. Let us see if this is the case. Constraining Y2 to a payoff of 12.6858, which
is what she gets from marrying X2, she can offer X1 a profile consisting of her own
education equal to 0.53136 and her consumption share equal to 0.48572 (both are less
than they would receive in a non-competitive match with him). This combination
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results in X1’s utility level rising to 15.9976 which is greater than what he gets from
the non-competitive match with Y1. Any agreement between Y2 and X1 which offers
Y2 slightly more than 12.6858 and X1 slightly less than 15.9976 will block a match
between X1 and Y1, at least under the profile generated by their non-competitive mar-
riage. To rule out such a blocking counteroffer, X1’s and Y1’s pre-nuptial contract is
re-calibrated against their outside options being to marry rival candidates.
In the case of X1 we have already seen that constraining Y2’s utility to 12.6858,
results in U¯12X1 = 15.9976. Likewise constraining X2’s utility to 13.7667, we can
calculate U¯21Y1 = 14.9166. The latter is actually less than what Y1 receives from a
non-competitive match with X1. When matching under the threat of alternative
partners, it is only X1 who could be tempted away. Thus we expect that when
pre-nuptial bargaining takes place under the competitive outside options rather than
the non-competitive ones, X1’s utility should rise while Y1’s should fall. Indeed, we
find that the equal gains solution applied to the outside options U¯12X1 = 15.9976,
U¯21Y1 = 14.9166 leads to U
11
X1
= 15.9983, U11Y1 = 14.9173. What is important here is
that this pair of payoffs is jointly robust to blocking offers from X2 or Y2.
The couple (X2, Y2) is based on less preferred candidates so their outside option
remains being single and their profile remains as with non-competitive marriage.
The table below summarises the payoffs in each match.
Table 3: Payoffs from competitive matching.
Y1 Y2
X1 15.9983, 14.9173 N.A.
X2 N.A 13.9184, 14.7555
We defer until later a comparison of female education and consumption shares be-
tween non-competitive matching and that which takes place in a competitive marriage
market.
44
7.2 Preferred male:
We next consider a case in which the preliminary rankings lead to one male being
preferred by both females while males are indifferent between females. Without loss
of generality let the preferred male be X1.
U1jYj ≥ U2jYj ≥ U sYj (26)
for both j = {1, 2} and
U i1Xi = U
i2
Xi
≥ U sXi (27)
for both i = {1, 2}.
The general strategy for finding a stable pattern in this case is analogous to the one
used in the previous sub-section so we shall skip the details and proceed straight to
an example.
Suppose that βX1 = βY1 = βY2 = 4 while βX2 = 3. In this example, only males differ,
the two females are identical. Under non-competitive matching each household profile
will depend only on the male partner. At the same time, under competitive matching,
females will be expected to receive equal treatment.
The table below reports household profiles and utility levels from non-competitive
matching at a market wage ω = 50: for j = 1, 2.
Table 4: Profiles from non-competitive matching.
Y1 and Y2
X1 (0.52836,0.51620)
X2 (0.53063,0.45445)
For analogous reasons as in the previous case, both females would prefer marrying
X1. By construction, the males are indifferent between the females.
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Table 5: Payoffs from non-competitive matching.
Y1 and Y2
X1 15.8482, 15.0670
X2 13.9184, 14.7555
Competition for X1 will result in the females being pinned down by their second-best
option, which is to marry X2. In equilibrium, regardless of who marries X1, both
females will attain the utility that they get from matching with X2. If this were not
the case, for example, if the female who marries X1 receives a higher utility than the
one who marries X2, then the latter female could attract away X1 by offering him a
slightly higher consumption share and/or slightly higher homemaking skills than he
receives from his present match.
The equilibrium payoffs are represented below (for the sake of comparison with pre-
vious sections we have resolved the tie so that Y1 marries X1).
Table 6: Payoffs from competitive matching.
Y1 Y2
X1 16.1503, 14.7555 N.A.
X2 N.A 13.9184, 14.7555
It might appear at first glance that the equal gains solution to marital matching does
not apply in this case. In fact, it does. Consider that the highest possible utility
that X1 could extract from marrying Y2 is the same as what he gets from marrying
Y1. Thus U¯
12
X1
= U11X1 . Similarly the highest utility that Y1 can obtain from marrying
X2 is the same as she gets from her marriage to X1. Thus U¯
21
Y1
= U11Y1 . In fact in
equilibrium, both X1 and Y1 receive no more or less than what they get under their
respective outside options so that their own match generates neither gains nor losses.
For X2 the only credible outside option is to stay single as under both exogenous and
equilibrium pairing, he is indifferent between the two females. In turn the female who
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marries him (Y2) also has as a residual outside option only the utility of remaining
single. Thus their equilibrium outcomes remain the same as in exogenous matching.
7.3 The effect of rising market wages:
We have so far focused on the effect of competition in a marriage market on the
equilibrium pattern of matches. In the above examples, the market wage was held
constant at ω = 50. An important aim of this paper is to study how changes in
the market wage induce changes in female education in the context of consensual
marriage. We now study this question in the context of the above examples of marital
matching. We focus on outcomes for the couple (X1, Y1) as both partners’ intrinsic
characteristics are identical to those of the solitary couple studied in the examples of
the previous section.
In the table below we compare, at values of ω that range from 50 to 200, Y1’s ed-
ucation, her share of the market good and X1’s and Y1’s utility levels under non-
competitive marriage and both examples of competitive matching that were studied
in the preceding sub-sections of this section. Although not reported it has been ver-
ified that (X1, Y1) remain a couple under a stable matching pattern at each wage.
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Table 7: Comparing outcomes and payoffs for the couple (X1, Y1).
NON-COMPETITIVE MARRIAGE PREFERRED COUPLE PREFERRED MALE
ω e11Y1
µ11 U11Y1
U11X1
e11Y1
µ11 U11Y1
U11X1
e11Y1
µ11 U11Y1
U11X1
50 0.52836 0.51620 15.0670 15.8482 0.52753 0.48640 14.9173 15.9983 0.53063 0.45445 14.7555 16.1503
100 0.52669 0.45649 16.7413 18.3038 0.52551 0.41456 16.4223 18.5841 0.52825 0.37153 16.0818 18.8576
150 0.52566 0.41972 17.9184 20.2621 0.52423 0.37001 17.4321 20.6548 0.52664 0.31899 16.9020 21.0386
200 0.52486 0.39191 18.8363 21.9613 0.523563 0.347667 18.3201 22.3565 0.52568 0.28995 17.599 22.8492
As compared to a non-competitive consensual match with X1, Y1 receives less utility
when their match takes place in a competitive market. In particular, even when she is
a preferred female, her utility is less than it is under non-competitive conditions. To
32At wages above ω = 400, the distinction between the two males becomes too small in our
example to make a difference between exogenous and equilibrium outcomes.
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some extent, the comparison is based on the choice of parameter values; given these,
Y2 appears to be a more effective rival in competing for X1, than X2 is in competing
for Y1. This works to X1’s advantage, raising the value of his outside option relative
to that of Y1. By contrast, the fact that Y1 receives even less utility from marrying
X1 when Y2 is her equal appears to be a more general result and not just a matter
of parameter values.
Although Y1 is worst off in utility terms in that case, her education is actually higher
in that case than in the other two cases. These comparisons hold true at each wage
in the interval under consideration. This outcome might also well be sensitive to
parameter values but it nonetheless illustrates an interesting possibility, that com-
petitive marriage formation can lead even females who are highly ranked by males in
the marriage market to trade off education in the pursuit of higher consumption and
higher overall utility in marrying highly-ranked males. This reinforces the intuition
and concerns underlying this paper.
To return to our main focus, in all three cases, Y1’s education and share of the
consumption good decrease with the market wage. This result was already derived
for the case of non-competitive matching in the previous section; the examples from
competitive matching reaffirm its robustness. The intuition for all three cases remains
the same: in the presence of gender wage inequality, an increase in the market wage
can increase male bargaining power relative to that of females, especially when the
latter specialise in housework when married. They opt for lower education and extract
a lower share of the rivalrous good from their husbands, even though their overall
utility rises due to higher absolute consumption of both market and household goods.
Some final points about the robustness of these results. The key driving force of
the model has been that, all else equal, females prefer a higher level of education
than what a prospective spouse might consider optimal. This is an idiosyncratic
48
phenomenon that affects otherwise equivalent couples, and might not apply across
socioeconomic classes, in which the phenomenon of hypergamy has been receiving
attention.33 In our own model, the male’s preference for female education is deter-
mined by its effect on household productivity and, in case of a wife who supplies
market labour, on her earnings. A wife’s education does not directly enter a hus-
band’s utility function or act as a signal of her social standing. Such considerations
could be incorporated without affecting our key arguments, so long as the female’s
private taste for education was strong enough to put her own ideal above that of her
spouse.
What would change the results is introducing factors which discourage females from
pursuing even that level of education that a suitor might prefer. Such factors could
involve schooling costs and/or differences in effort or ability needed to convert ed-
ucation into marketable and/or household skills. These factors could work against
the female’s private taste for education and induce outcomes in which females enter
the marriage market with what their potential spouses consider sub-optimal levels of
education. In that case, a strengthening of male bargaining power might induce fe-
males to increase their education, while marital competition might lead to a reversal
of behaviour by a female whose bargaining power decreases in the presence of a rival.
It might also be argued that were agents to be endowed with marketable assets or
bequests, a bride-price and/or dowry could constitute a more efficient, lump-sum
mechanism for ensuring that the marital selection constraints were jointly satisfied.
This is indeed true since it would give the female an additional dimension for meeting
the male selection constraint and might relax the need for her to increase her house-
hold skills in order to meet his outside options as the market wage increases. However,
unless a bride’s endowment is arbitrarily large, if the pre-nuptial bargain requires a
33See, for example, recent papers by Abramitzky et. al. [2011], Banerjee et. al. [2013], Lafortune
[2013].
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large enough transfer to the groom, part of it might still need to be conditioned on
variables such as female household skills.
8 Conclusions:
This paper has compared female education and time-use under three states: (i) re-
maining single, (ii) exogenous marriage formation and (iii) consensual marriage. Our
analysis suggests that single females receive more education and work more than
married ones. Additionally, consensually married females who are likely to specialise
in housework face an additional constraint regarding their housekeeping skills and
this can lower their education even more than exogenous marriage formation does.
Our model also suggests that neither does reducing labor market discrimination nec-
essarily lead to a continuous decline in the gender gap affecting married females’
labour force participation and education, nor does an increase in market wages un-
ambiguously lead to an increase in married females’ education. Indeed our numerical
examples illustrated a range of market wages over which married couples mutually
specialised in time use, and female education declined with the market wage. Once
wages had risen enough, females stops specialising in housework and further wage
increases had positive effects on their education.
From an empirical point of view, whether or not an across-the-board increase in
market wages will discourage female education depends on many factors, of which
our analysis identifies only one. This effect could be confounded by other factors, of
which evolving social attitudes, innate preferences among males regarding their wives
educational and social status and the efforts by governments and international or-
ganisations to lower gender imbalances in labour force and educational participation,
will be important.
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In our paper this effect appears to be restricted to females who specialise in house-
work. As the extent of such specialisation varies from region to region, it will be more
relevant to South Asia, where labour force participation by women is particularly low,
than to all developing regions. In the latest available figures from the World Bank,
Pakistan’s female labour force participation in 2011 was only 23%, Afghanistan’s
16%, India’s 29% and Bangladesh’s 57% (World Bank, 2012).
It is also worth noting the observed U-shaped relationship between female labour
force participation and household income [Mammen and Paxson [2000]). In other
words it is at middle levels of income that females are least likely to work outside the
home. Thus although a special case of our model, female specialisation in housework
seems to fit the overall context of our analysis quite well. Indeed, although a recent
study of female labour force participation in India by Bhalla and Kaur [2011] finds
no evidence for a U-shaped relationship between family income and female labour
force participation in the aggregate data, it does find a strong negative effect of high
male education and earnings on work by a wife. This provides some support for the
relevance of mutual specialisation as an outcome in middle-class households.
The literature on statistical discrimination points to a circular relationship between a
disadvantaged group’s labor low market participation and the tendency of employers
to statistically discriminate against them (see Aigner and Cain [1977]). Our model
suggests that marriage plays a compounding role in this relationship.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: The first-order conditions for single agents are given by
equations (7) and (8) respectively:
u′(·)ωe− αh′(·) = 0
u′(·)ω`+ b+ h′(·)(1− `)A′(e) = 0
Totally differentiating the above with respect to `, e and ω, and arranging in matrix
form we obtain:[
u′′ω2e2 + h′′α2 ωΦ− A′χ
ωΦ− A′χ u′′ω2`2 + h′′(A′(1− `))2 + h′(1− `)A′′
] [
∂`
∂e
]
=
[ −eΦ∂ω
−`Φ∂ω
]
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where
Φ = u′ + u′′c > 0 by (A-4)
χ = h′ + α(1− `)h′′ > 0 by (A-5)
Therefore
ωΦ− A′χ > 0 since A′ < 0
The determinant of the left-hand side is
∆ = (u′′ω2e2 + h′′α2) · (u′′ω2`2 + h′′(A′(1− `))2 + h′(1− `)A′′)− (ωΦ− A′χ)2
which, although not unambiguous in sign, needs to be positive for the maximand to
be concave (principal minors need to alternate in sign).
Using Cramer’s Rule, we then obtain the following comparative static effects
∂`
∂ω
=
−eΦ(u′′ω2`2 + h′′(A′(1− `))2 + h′(1− `)A′′) + `Φ(ωΦ− A′χ)
∆
∂e
∂ω
=
−`Φ(u′′ω2e2 + h′′α2) + eΦ(ωΦ− A′χ)
∆
which are both positive under (A-4) and (A-5). 
Proof of Proposition 2: We have already established that, given the combination
of ωX > ωY and eX ≥ eY , there is specialisation in the time use of the married couple.
Three cases arise: (i) `X = 1, `Y ∈ (0, 1); (ii) `X = 1, `Y = 0 and (iii) `X ∈ (0, 1),
`Y = 0.
Since `X = 1 in cases (i) and (ii), eX = 1, so the inequality follows trivially. In case
(iii), with `X < 1, note that `Y = 0 so the optimal value of education for agent Y
satisfies
h′(·)(1− `Y )A′(eY ) + b = 0
Plugging the value of eY that satisfies the above first-order condition, into X’s first-
order condition
0.5u′(·)ωX`X + h′(·)(1− `X)A′(eY ) + b > 0
Since ωX > ωY , `X > `Y = 0, (1 − `X) < (1 − `Y ) = 1 and the other terms are
identical for both spouses, it is clear the above equation is strictly positive when
evaluated at eY . Thus eX > eY . 
Proof of Proposition 3: The proposition is obvious when `aY = 0 so the only case
in which it needs to be proven is when `aY > 0. If this is the case then e
a
X = 1 and
1− `aX = 0.
Now suppose that in fact `aY ≥ `sY . Then 1− `aY ≤ 1− `sY . By the concavity of h(·),
it must then be the case that 2αY h
′(αY (1 − `aY )) ≥ αY h′(αY (1 − `sY )). From the
respective first-order conditions for the labor supply of agent Y ’s married and single
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self (both of which hold as equalities in this case), it follows from comparing terms
that
u′
(
wX + wY eY `
a
Y
2
)
≥ u′ (wY eY `sY )
where eY is an arbitrary level of education for Y . By the concavity of u(·), this
implies that
wX + wY eY `
a
Y
2
≤ wY eY `sY
But since our working hypothesis is that wY eY `
a
Y ≥ wY eY `sY , the above can only
be true if wX ≤ wY eY `sY which is not possible since wX > wY and 1 ≥ esY . Thus
`aY < `
s
Y . 
The following lemmas are useful for proving Proposition 4.
Lemma 1: Under (A-4) and (A-5), the first-order conditions for labor and education
respectively for both single and married females imply that, given that a female
supplies positive labour in both states
∂`kY
∂ekY
∣∣∣∣
`k∗
> 0
∂`kY
∂ekY
∣∣∣∣
ek∗
> 0
for k = {s, a}; |`k∗ indicates a derivative along the first-order condition for labor while
|ek∗ indicates a derivative along the first-order condition for education.
Proof: Differentiating the relevant first-order conditions for `Y and eY , keeping in
mind that the exercise applies only for interior solutions in the case of married agents,
we get the following
∂`sY
∂esY
∣∣∣∣
`s∗
= −(u
′′ · csY + u′)ωY − A′ · (h′′α · (1− `sY ) + h′)
u′′ · (ωY )2(esY )2 + α2h′′
(A.1)
∂`sY
∂esY
∣∣∣∣
es
∗
= −u
′′ · (ωY )2 + (A′)2(1− `sY )2h′′ + A′′h′ · (1− `sY )
(u′′ · csY + u′)ωY − A′ (h′′ · α · (1− `sY ) + h′)
(A.2)
∂`aY
∂eaY
∣∣∣∣
`a∗
= −(u
′′ · (caY − 0.5ωX) + u′)ωY − 2A′ · (h′′α · (1− `aY ) + h′)
u′′(ωY )2(eaY )2 + α2h′′
(A.3)
∂`aY
∂eaY
∣∣∣∣
ea∗
= − u
′′ · (ωY )2 + (A′)2(1− `aY )2h′′ + A′′h′ · (1− `aY )
(u′′ · (caY − 0.5ωX) + u′)ωY − A′ · (h′′α(1− `aY ) + h′)
(A.4)
Since the denominators of equations (A.1) and A.3) and the numerators of equations
(A.2) and (A.4) are unambiguously negative, (A-4) and (A-5) are sufficient for each
of the above derivatives to be positive. 
It follows from Lemma 1 that ekY and `
k
Y , k = {s, a} are monotonically related along
each first-order condition. This further suggests that along each first-order condition
we can define functional relationships between the two variables. For example, along
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the first-order condition for labour we can define `kY (e
k
Y ) as the function which relates
female labour supply to her educational level. We could define an analogous func-
tional dependence of `kY on e
k
Y along the first-order condition for education but for
expositional convenience we shall define the inverse function in this case: ekY (`
k
Y ).
Lemma 2: Concavity of the maximisation problem requires that
∂`ki
∂eki
∣∣∣∣
ek∗
>
∂`ki
∂eki
∣∣∣∣
`k∗
for i = X, Y and k = s, a.
Proof: For single agents, the Hessian matrix formed by the own- and the cross-partial
derivatives of each first-order condition with respect to each choice variable is two-
dimensional. For married agents, there are four endogenous variables in principle.
However, because at least one spouse is always in a corner with respect to labor
supply, the Hessian is also two-dimensional, if it is defined at all.
The determinant of the Hessian is
∂`ki
∂eki
∣∣∣∣
ek∗
− ∂`
k
i
∂eki
∣∣∣∣
`k∗
where, in the married agent’s case, i is the spouse whose labor supply is interior.
It is easily verified that the diagonal elements of the Hessian are negative so the
principal minors alternate in sign as (required for concavity) if and only if the above
expression is positive. 
An implication of Lemmas 1 and 2 is that equilibrium is stable.
Lemma 3: At given `Y , e
a
Y < e
s
Y .
Proof:
Recall equation (8), the first-order condition for education of Y ’s single self. This
can be rewritten as
u′ (ωY esY `Y )ωY `Y + b = −h′(A(esY )(1− `Y ))(1− `Y )A′(esY ) (A.5)
where `Y is arbitrary and e
s
Y is an equilibrium value that satisfies the above equation.
Similarly recall equation (10). the analogous first-order condition for Y ’s married
self. Recall that the context of this proposition is one in which eaX = 1 and `
a
X = 1;
thus equation (10) can be rewritten as
0.5u′
(
ωX + ωY `Y e
a
Y
2
)
ωY `Y + b = −h′(A(eaY )(1− `Y ))(1− `Y )A′(eaY ) (A.6)
Let Λ = −h′(A(e)(1 − `))(1 − `)A′(e) for a generic agent at either marital status.
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Differentiating Λ with respect to e:
∂Λ
∂e
= −h′′(·)(1− `)2(A(e))2 − h′(·)(1− `)A′′(e) > 0
since both h′′ and A′′ are negative. This establishes that the RHS of equation (A.6)
is increasing in eaY .
Now let esY solve equation (A.5) and evaluate equation (A.6) at this value of eY .
The LHS of equation (A.5) must be strictly greater than that of equation (A.6).
This is both because her married self’s marginal utility from market consumption is
multiplied by 0.5 and because it would in any case be lower than that of her single
self for given ωY and `Y . Note that at given values of these variables, Y
′s market
consumption will be higher and her marginal utility lower, when married to the higher
paid agent X than when single.
Furthermore, by inspection, the RHS of equation (A.5) and equation (A.6) are equal.
Hence, evaluated at esY , the LHS of Equation (A.6) is smaller than the RHS. In other
words, the marginal cost of married Y ’s education is strictly greater than its marginal
benefit; and since the LHS of equation is decreasing while the RHS is increasing in
eY , all else equal, this implies that e
a
Y < e
s
Y for given values of `Y . 
Proof of Proposition 4: Suppose that an equilibrium exists in the case of exogenous
marriage formation. Note that equilibrium values (ea
∗
Y , `
a∗
Y ) may be written as `
a∗
Y =
`aY (e
a∗
Y ) and e
a∗
Y = e
a
Y (`
a∗
Y ) as argued after the proof of Lemma 1.
Given Lemma 3, it must be the case that esY (`
a∗
Y ) > e
a∗
Y . Denote this value of e
s
Y as
es′Y . Then, from Lemma 1 it must be the case that `
s′
Y = `
s
Y (e
s′
Y ) > `
a∗
Y . From Lemma
1 again, it will further be the case that that there exists es′′Y = e
s
Y (`
s′
Y ) satisfying
es′′Y ≥ es′Y and by further induction `s′′Y = `sY (es′′Y ) > `s′Y and so on. Lemma 2 ensures
that this process converges monotonically to a pair (`s
∗
Y , e
s∗
Y ) such that `
s∗
Y = `
s
Y (e
s∗
Y )
and es
∗
Y = e
s
Y (`
s∗
Y ). By induction, the series of inequalities along the way ensure that
`s
∗
Y > `
a∗
Y and that e
s∗
Y > e
a∗
Y . 
Proof of Proposition 5: Totally differentiating equations (17)-(19) with respect
to emY , µ and λ we obtain a 3×3 matrix system G 0 −b0 (1− λ)u′′(cmY ) + λu′′(cmX) −J
−b −ωJ 0
 ∂em∂µ
∂λ
 =
 0M∂ω
Ψω∂ω

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where:
G ≡ (A′)2h′′ + h′A′′ < 0
H ≡ (1− λ)u′′(cmY ) + λu′′(cmX) < 0
J ≡ (u′(cmX) + u′(cmY )) > 0
M ≡ λ(1− µ)u′′(cmX) + (1− λ)µu′′(cmY ) = 0 under (A-7)
Ψsω ≡
∂Ψs
∂ω
Ψω ≡ Ψsω −
[
(1− µ)∂u
′(cmX)
∂ω
− µ∂u
′(cmY )
∂ω
]
> 0 under (A-6)
The determinant of the left-hand side matrix is:
D = − [ωGJ + b2H] > 0
Using Cramer’s rule we obtain (note that under (A-7), M=0 and drops out):
∂emY
∂ω
=
bΨωH
D < 0
∂µ
∂ω
=
GJΨω
D < 0
which establishes the result. 
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Numerical Tables:
Table 8: Benchmark Case: φ = 0.5
ω esX `
s
X e
s
Y `
s
Y e
a
Y `
a
Y µ e
m
Y `
m
Y U
s
X U
s
Y U
a
X U
a
Y U
m
X U
m
Y
50 0.642 0.304 0.599 0.163 0.55556 0 0.516 0.52836 0 11.56 10.78 15.89 15.00 15.85 15.07
100 0.729 0.536 0.642 0.304 0.55556 0 0.456 0.52669 0 13.13 11.56 17.96 17.07 18.30 16.74
500 1 1 0.990 0.987 0.55556 0 0.326 0.52290 0 24.36 17.81 26.70 25.81 29.29 22.75
1000 1 1 1 1 0.55556 0 0.317 0.52264 0 33.62 24.36 33.25 32.36 37.06 27.80
1500 1 1 1 1 0.55556 0 0.314 0.52253 0 40.73 29.39 38.28 37.39 43.02 31.67
2000 1 1 1 1 0.55556 0 0.312 0.52246 0 46.72 33.62 42.51 41.62 48.04 34.94
2100 1 1 1 1 0.57813 0.088 0.311 0.52245 0 47.83 34.40 43.25 42.41 48.97 35.55
2300 1 1 1 1 0.66493 0.370 0.311 0.54367 0.023 49.96 35.91 44.64 43.97 50.75 36.70
2500 1 1 1 1 0.75174 0.587 0.316 0.62700 0.308 52.00 37.36 46.03 45.53 52.51 37.87
Table 9: Variant: φ = 0.95
ω esX `
s
X e
s
Y `
s
Y e
a
Y `
a
Y µ e
m
Y `
m
Y U
s
X U
s
Y U
a
X U
a
Y U
m
X U
m
Y
50 0.642 0.304 0.638 0.290 0.55556 0 0.58581 0.53031 0 11.56 11.48 15.89 15.00 15.48 15.40
100 0.729 0.536 0.720 0.515 0.55556 0 0.55541 0.52945 0 13.13 12.97 17.96 17.07 17.60 17.44
200 0.903 0.865 0.885 0.838 0.55556 0 0.53148 0.52878 0 16.25 15.94 20.89 20.00 20.61 20.30
400 1 1 1 1 0.55556 0 0.51545 0.52834 0 22.00 21.49 25.03 24.14 24.85 24.35
500 1 1 1 1 0.55556 0 0.51193 0.52824 0 24.36 23.79 26.70 25.81 26.55 25.99
600 1 1 1 1 0.58251 0.10412 0.50934 0.52817 0 26.49 25.87 28.16 27.33 28.09 27.47
800 1 1 1 1 0.74744 0.57763 0.49929 0.65779 0.41831 30.28 29.57 30.80 30.30 30.95 30.24
1000 1 1 1 1 0.91237 0.87995 0.49237 0.81387 0.74446 33.62 32.82 33.44 33.26 33.80 33.00
60
